More justice (punishing sin) in the world may come at the cost of hiddenness.1 This is relevant because, like mercy, justice (treating sin as it ought to be treated) is also a great good.
There are two ways in which it can cost justice.
First, God's making His existence clear to sinners may be a travesty.
• Travis Dumsday: “…in our current state of moral corruption, are we worthy to have a personal relationship with God? Are we worthy, that is, to enter into intimate communion with a Being who is perfectly righteous, “that than which nothing greater can be conceived”? Or is it instead the case that we deserve to be excluded from such communion, at least for the time being? Based on the record of our past actions and omissions and the state of our characters, what do we deserve before God? I would submit that we deserve exclusion … we are justly excluded from relationship,” [“Divine Hiddenness as Deserved” Faith and Philosophy 31:2 (2014): 293.] Second, in the Christian tradition, sinners being punished to the right degree for wrongdoings is not a bad thing; it is a good thing. If God chose to deal with all men justy, it would be a great good. If God had instead ensured more persons believe in Him, then it may be that more receive God’s free gift of salvation. This is good, but the downside is that it results in less justice. So hiddenness buys more justice. Matthew 13:13-15 -- I speak to them [sinners] in parables; because… ‘otherwise they would… hear with their ears, and understand with their heart and return, and I would heal [save] them.’).
The argument here is that if hiddenness is meant to allow/increase justice, then what about children? Since children are innocent, and therefore not due for just punishment, God's hiding from them does not increase justice in their case. That is to say, God should not be hidden to innocent children. By way of response, however,
• Many in Christian thought believe even children are guilty or corrupt.
• The utility of the justice response need not be in its explaning everything. It can be important insofar as it can factor into explaining most cases of hiddenness. • Consider too that “if God were to reveal Himself in the manner recommended by Schellenberg, such that all children had a powerful experience of the divine, this would surely trickle up to adults; we would notice the peculiarly consistent (indeed universal) story coming from the children, the evidential force of which would surely compel a recognition by adults of the truth of theism. And as we have seen, such knowledge might actually be bad for us.”
The main proponent of the hiddenness argument insists that we only focus on God's love, and set aside concerns of justice.
• J. L. Schellenberg: “[I]f only God’s justice need be saved, the theist may always point to the possibility that everything will even out in the end – that those who fail to benefit from belief in this life will be compensated hereafter. Or else she may claim that it is not unjust to give a gift to someone while not giving it to others, unless everyone can be shown to be entitled to it.” [Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Cornell, 1993), 4.] However, God's being all-loving does not necessarily imply that God will do loving things when possible, and especially not the most loving thing. After all, an all-good God could also be perfectly just, and consequently be in situations where treating someone justly is incompatible with treating someone lovingly. In such a situation, God may be properly torn between the two good options and just choose one or the other, perhaps on the basis of higher-order goods. Sometimes then, a perfectly good God may choose to deal with someone justly to the exclusion of treating them with loving mercy.
More mercy (refraining from just punishment) may come at the cost of more divine hiddenness. [Forthcoming] This is relevant because, like mercy, justice is also a great good.
Moral knowledge in the world may come at the cost of more divine hiddenness.[Forthcoming] This is relevant because moral knowledge is good.
More morally significant freedom may come at the cost of more divine hiddenness.1 For example,
This is relevant because such uncoerced choices are required for morally significant freedom, and morally significant freedom is a great good. We know this because…
• …we can intuitively recognize free will as intrinsically good
• …freely loving God is good
• …we can recognize it as instrumentally good, allowing for…
• …freely making truly significant moral decisions,
• …freely forming bonds of love in response to evil
• …freely helping others in general,
• …freely performing honorable acts in general
• …freely cultivating and forming our own character is good.2
…awareness of God has not coerced Satan, Adam & Eve, nor many believers1