Would some non-theists just form an improper relationship with God if they became theists in their current state?

Clarifying the question

The question most directly relates to the problem of divine hiddenness (i.e. if a loving God exists, then wouldn't that God make sure no one is an atheist or agnostic, so that everyone is at least able to be in relationship if they wanted?) Consider two responses:
• God's bringing some persons to faith at any time would result in their entering into an improper relationship with God, and this is a worse state of affairs than being out of relationship at all times.
• God's bringing some persons to faith prior to a certain time would result their entering into an improper relationship with God, and this is a worse state of affairs than being out of relationship prior to that certain time.¹

A proper relationship would presumably be, among other things, durable, worship-involving, morally transforming, and not done for poor reasons (e.g. for power, pleasure, or pride). Some of these features, if lacking in divine-human relationship, would plausibly preclude relationship to begin with. It would be a pseudo-relationship.

For any given non-theist, it is notoriously difficult to establish that this individual would not have an improper relationship, either immediately or some time after entering relationship.²

So the following question is important: would some non-theists form a perpetually improper relationship upon becoming a theist?

1. For example, a belief that was formed for wrong or inferior reasons:

   • Paul Moser (Philosophy professor at Loyola Chicago) & Daniel Howard-Snyder (Philosophy professor at Western Michigan): “It may well be that God wants people to believe in His existence for certain reasons and not for others, that He prefers that they do not believe at all if the only option is to believe for the wrong reasons.” [“Introduction” in Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (eds) P. Moser & D. Howard-Snyder (Cambridge, 2002), 12.] Perhaps being wrong because it precludes other traits:
   • Peter van Inwagen (Philosophy professor at Notre Dame and Duke): “Most theists hold that God expects a good deal more from us than mere belief in his existence. He expects a complex of things, of which belief in his existence is a small (although essential) part. It is certainly conceivable that someone’s believing in him for a certain reason (because, say, that person has witnessed signs and wonders) might make it difficult or even impossible for that person to acquire other features God wanted him or her to have.” [“What Is the Problem of the Hiddenness of God?” in Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (eds) P. Moser & D. Howard-Snyder (Cambridge, 2002), 29.] Traits which they can't simply will themselves to acquire:
   • Robert T. Lehe (Philosophy professor at North Central College): “…if God had revealed himself so clearly that no one could reasonably deny his existence and planted in everyone's mind truths about God's nature and expectations, it would be like telling an alcoholic that he needs to stop drinking. The alcoholic might agree intellectually that he needs to change his life. But there is a kind of inner appropriation of this truth that is required in order for the alcoholic to be willing to take the steps necessary to get his life in order.” [“A Response to the Argument from the Reasonableness of Nonbelief,” Faith and Philosophy 21(2) (2004): 166.] So a certain amount of delicate bobbing and weaving may be necessary to cultivate belief for right reasons:
   • Chad Meister (Philosophy professor at Bethel College): “On one interpretation of this passage, Jesus' reason for speaking in parables was that some people are not in a position to hear about the truths and reality of God in a straightforward manner since they have shut their eyes and closed their ears (perhaps knowingly, freely and culpably; perhaps not). The parables, then, are a means of getting the truths and purposes of God into human hearts and minds by veiling the message in such a way that it nonthreateningly and gradually unfolds in the hearts and minds of the hearers. This veiling may be due to either intentional (and so culpable) unreceptivity or unintentional (and so noncupable) unreceptivity by the individual.” [“Evil and the Hiddenness of God” in God and Evil: The Case for God in a World Filled with Pain (eds) Meister & Dew Jr. (IVP, 2013), 146.]

2. As noted by one philosopher:

   • Daniel Howard-Snyder (Philosophy professor at Western Michigan): “Even if there were any such people [people thoroughly well-disposed to God, from their own merit, and not in need of further virtue/better motives before properly entering into that relationship], we don’t have what it takes to tell whether there are any. This is one of the key differences between the Argument from Divine Hiddenness and the best versions of the argument from evil. While, in the words of Ivan Karamazov, it is ‘unanswerably clear’ that innocent children suffer horribly, it is unanswerably unclear whether the love to which any well-disposed inculpable nonbeliever is disposed is sufficiently fitting for its object.” [“The Argument from Divine Hiddenness” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1996) 450.] If an atheist like Schellenberg wants to talk about a particularly deep and explicit relationship, then it becomes even less clear who would enter and stay in proper relationship. A certain amount of bobbing and weaving from God might be necessary in order to woo someone into a perpetual proper relationship.