Just intuitively, it seems that an elegant law-governed world is intrinsically good.1
Accentuating or producing a Moral Arena is good. (What is a moral arena?)1 This is relevant because a moral arena requires that the world's law-like regularities operate in an ordered and predictable way.2
F. R. Tennant: “[A] physical order characterized by law and regularity. … is an essential condition of the world being a theatre of moral life. Without such regularity in physical phenomena there could be no probability to guide us: no prediction, no prudence, no accumulating of ordered experience, no pursuit of premeditated ends, no formation of habit, no possibility of character or of culture. [Philosophical Theology (Cambridge, 1928), ii. 199–200.] In order to be able to make a difference in how things go in their world, creatures must be situated in an environment in which their choices lead to results which are, at least typically, of the sort the agent intends. [136.] This is in turn good for many other things. (E.g. for soul-making etc.); Rationality is good (reasoning to the truth).; Good for responsibility; You can extend your powers etc.
Richard Swinburne: “if God is to allow us to acquire knowledge by learning from experience and above all to allow us to choose whether to acquire knowledge at all or even to allow us to have very well-justified knowledge of the consequences of our actions—knowledge which we need if we are to have a free and efficacious choice between good and bad—he needs to provide natural evils occurring in regular ways in consequence of natural processes. Or rather, he needs to do this if he is not to give us too evident an awareness of his presence.” [Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford, 1998), 194.]; “Embodiment in a world governed by simple laws of nature secures the goal of an initial limited repertoire of power and knowledge, and a means (by discovering those laws) for extending it. God has this reason for making a universe with simple laws of nature: to provide for embodied beings to have a limited repertoire of power and knowledge and a means of extending it.” [Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford, 1998), 105.]See T. J. Mawson ‘The Possibility of a Free-will Defense for the Problem of Natural Evil’, Religious Studies, 40 (2004), 23–42. The point has been made by many:
>Bruce Reichenbach: “without regularity of sequence [in cause and effect based on a natural order], agents could not entertain rational expectations, make predictions, estimate probabilities, or calculate prudence. They would not be able to know what to expect about any course of action they would like to take. Whether or not such action would be possible, or what they would have to do to have God bring it about, whether it could occur as they planned (supposing agents could plan, which is doubtful), what the consequences would be—all this would be unknown and unknowable. Hence, agents could not know or even suppose what course of action to take to accomplish a certain rationally conceived goal. Thus, rational agents could neither propose action nor act themselves. … ‘Good’ is predicated of a moral agent when proper intentions come to fruition in right conduct: ‘bad’ when improper intentions result in wrong conduct. But since they would be unable to rationally conceive what actions to take in order to achieve certain goals, and since they could not perform the actions, a world … [without regularity] would prevent moral agents from formulating or carrying out their moral intentions. In effect, it would become impossible for agents to be moral beings.” [Evil and a Good God (Fordham University Press, 1982), 103-4.]
Jon Roberts: The world disclosed by science made theological sense only if intelligible, law-like processes were seen as witnesses to the providential concern of a God whose will was immutable. In this connection, many Protestants placed a great deal of emphasis on the familiar claim that intelligible events enabled God’s children to interpret the cosmos. This ability afforded them intellectual gratification, a clearer apprehension of the wisdom of God, and assistance in their efforts to make their way in the world. [Darwinism and the Divine in America: Protestant Intellectuals and Organic Evolution (University of Notre Dame, 2001), 144.] (cited by Murray)
The enterprise of (and ability to engage in) science is good. This is relevant because without an elegant regularity to the patterns of nature, doing science would be impossible.
George Frederick Wright: “The pleasurable sensations of the intellect, investigating and interpreting the ways of God as displayed in the creation, are likewise a part of that good included in the end for which all things were made [Studies in Science and Religion (Draper, 1882), 194.]